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Abstract
This paper presents new results on the relationship between severance pay and labor market
performance for a sample of 21 OECD countries, 1956-84. Specifically, it evaluates Lazear's
(1990) empirical argument that severance pay reduces employment and elevates joblessness. His
findings are shown not to survive correction for errors in the data and the application of correct
estimation procedures. Furthermore, adverse labor market consequences of severance pay are not
detected in a dynamic characterization of the Lazear model. Limitations of the approach followed
here - the focus on a single measure of employment protection and the parsimonious nature of the
reduced form model - are also addressed and co textualized.
JEL Codes: E24; J65.
We thank, without implicating, two anonymous referees and Co-editor Kathy Hayes for helpful
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1. Introduction
Concern over the adverse employment consequences of employment protection
legislation is a recurring theme in labor market analysis. Recent, and conflicting, applied
treatments include Scarpetta (1996) and Nickell (1997). The unfolding empirical analysis of the
effects of employment protection shares certain similarities with investigation of the
covariation of collective bargaining structures and macroeconomic outcomes (see, for example,
Calmfors and Driffill 1988; OECD 1997). In both cases, the models are typically reduced form
and the empirical evidence rather mixed.
The present paper offers a replication and critique of Lazear's (1990) famous empirical
model of employment protection, which is the sole extant empirical treatment to allow for
changes in a measure of employment protection over an extended time interval. Our concern is
not so much with theoretical issues as with the sensitivity of Lazear's results to data problems.
Suffice it to say here that the theoretical analysis of the long-run effects of employment
protection produces ambiguous results (e.g. Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Bertola 1991;
Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1994; Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993; Saint-Paul 1995). Accordingly,
there is a premium on empirical analysis.1
It should perhaps come as no surprise to learn that Lazear did not deny that
employment protection could be benign - in perfectly functioning markets the parties would
efficiently negotiate around a severance pay mandate via appropriate side payments from
worker to firm - or argue that outcomes were independent of the stage of the cycle (see
Hamermesh, 1993), or for that matter assert that negative effects would be observed across all
outcome indicators (adverse effects being more clear-cut for employment than for
unemployment, where discouragement could even generate a reduction in unemployment).
Rather, his position was that in the presence of constraints on efficient contracts employment
protection rules might be expected to bind in regular (and especially European) markets. His
tests were designed accordingly.
Our criticism of Lazear is that, quite apart from errors in his data, he did not adequately
investigate the statistical problems stemming from his use of pooled cross-secti nal and
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time-series data, even if recognition of the problems emphasized in the present treatment is
apparent in his narrative. We refer in particular to the problems of country heterogeneity and
autocorrelation. We shall report that almost all of the statistical significance attaching to
Lazear's key employment protection measure evaporates once the appropriate econometric
procedures are employed. This is not the end of the story, however, because of the limitations
of the employment protection variable and the parsimonious nature of the estimating equations
used here. Both issues will be addressed in the context of the developing employment
protection research literature.
2. Data and Methodology
The data and variables used in this inquiry in principle follow those of Lazear, to whom
we are indebted for supplying us with a diskette containing the raw data (and the programs)
used in his study. The data have been corrected for the errors of omission and commission
identified by Addison and Grosso (1996). The Data Appendix illustrates the main issues. We
note that the data errors do not overturn Lazear's principal findings, taken at face value, even if
they do serve substantially to alter the point estimates.
In estimating the employment effects of statutory job protection, Lazear in tially uses
data on 20 OECD countries for the sample period 1956-84. His data are not complete for all
variables and years. Lazear actually collected data on 22 countries but subsequently dropped
two nations (Canada and Hong Kong). Our sample of countries and time frame is the same as
that of Lazear, with the exceptions noted in the Data Appendix. Suffice it to say that sample
differences were not material to any of the results reported below.
Lazear examines the determinants of four outcome indicators: the
employment-population ratio (EMPPOP), the unemployment rate (UNRATE), the labor force
participation rate (LFPR), and the average hours worked by production workers (HOURS).
Values of each of the first three dependent variables differ slightly from those used by Lazear
because we were able to obtain updated estimates of the size of the population, civilian labor
force, and employment used in their construction. Rather more important changes were
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introduced into the HOURS variable; chiefly because of the need to provide a consistent time
series, and also to substitute a correct measure of weekly hours for Italy to replace the
erroneous daily hours measure inadvertently used by Lazear (1990, Table 1, column 3).
Turning to the independent variables, the crucial employment protection measure is
severance pay (SEV). This is defined as the statutory entitlement in months of pay due to a
blue-collar worker with ten years of service on termination for reasons unconnected with
his/her behavior. The measure thus pertains to no-fault individual dismissals for economic
reasons. Comment on the efficacy of this measure is provided below.
The remaining covariates are a quadratic time trend, represented by YEAR and
YEAR2; a demographic control for the population of working age (WRKAGE);2 and the
growth in per capita gross domestic product (GROWTH), to accommodate the notion that a
growing economy vitiates at least in part the probabilistic costs of a severance pay mandate
(see Gavin 1996). Unusually, in his fitted regressions Lazear only enters the latter variable in
interaction with severance pay. As is more conventional, we instead include both GROWTH
and its interaction with severance pay (GROWTH.SEV).
The majority of Lazear's estimates are from outcome equations that include just the
time trend variables TIME and TIME2 and the key dismissals protection indicator. This has
perhaps served to amplify the principal criticisms of the model, namely, that it abstracts from
many variables that may be expected to affect structural unemployment and employment rates,
while its key independent variable, severance pay, is at best a partial indicator of the legal
regulations applying in a particular country. (There is also the neglected issue of other
constraints operating through the collective bargaining system.) But we note parenthetically
that Lazear (1990, p.720) does at least use his expanded set of variables to explain changes in
unemployment rates, in a specification that combines cross-section and time-series variation.
He concludes that in some countries more generous severance pay "can go a long way in
explaining the changes in employment over time" (Lazear 1990, p.720). Singled out as cases in
point are France, Portugal, Italy, and Israel.
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Although our interest is primarily in re-assessing Lazear's model per se, both criticisms
have to be addressed at this point. Consider first the dismissals protection variable. Recent
work in the employment protection area has sought to widen the definition of dismissals
protection. Perhaps the best-known measure has been constructed by Grubb and Wells (1993),
who identify three elements of a "system" of employment protection: restrictions on dismissals;
restrictions on temporary forms of employment contract (so-called "atypical work"); and
restrictions on working hours.
The first element covers not only severance pay, as in L zear, but also procedural
delays and unfair dismissal provisions. (Note, however, that there is no recognition of
regulations concerning collective dismissals.)3 The second element encompasses restrictions on
the use of fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work, such as the permissible grounds for
their use, the maximum number of successive contracts, and their maximum cumulated
duration. Finally, hours restrictions cover such things as the length of the normal working
week, annual overtime limits, minimum rest periods, and restrictions on night work.
Using simple unweighted averages of rankings, Grubb and Wells (1993, 24) provide
summary indexes for each component, together with a grand ranking for the overall strictness
of the regulatory climate which is reproduced in column 3 of Table 1. An analogous procedure
is employed by the OECD (1994, p.74) to (average) rank countries by the severity of their legal
restrictions on regular and atypical work, the results of which are reported in column 4 of the
table. In each case, the ranking is from least to most regulated, and the data describe the
"situation in the late 1980s." We note that the OECD ranking in column 4 has commonly been
used in most of the recent employment protection studies (see below).4
[Table 1 near here]
Given that legislative rules may be only part of the story, other researchers have
exploited less ambitious but potentially more encompassing "reputation" indexes based on
surveys of employers. One such index is provided in column 5 of the table. It uses data from a
survey conducted by the International Organization of Employers (1985), as distributed to
European and non-European employer federations. The urvey seeks to identify the importance
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of obstacles to the termination of regular employment and the deployment of atypical workers.
The entries in column 5 are taken from the OECD (1994, p.74) and measure the reported levels
of difficulty on an ascending scale of 0-3 (regulatory constraints were classified as
insignificant, minor, serious, or fundamental), averaged over regular and fixed-term contracts.
Two other employment protection indexes derived from employer surveys, have also
been used in the literature. Column 6 of Table 1 provides results from an ad hoc survey of some
8,000 industrial firms conducted by the European Community (Commission 1986) at the end of
1985. The survey inquires of the management respondents which of a number of reasons
explained their not employing more people at the time of the survey, and asks them to indicate
whether each one was "very important", "important," or "not important." One such reason is
"insufficient flexibility in shedding labor." The entries in column 6 of the table are obtained by
assigning a value of 2 (1) to the percentages of firms responding that this reason was "very
important" ("important"). Clearly, other weighting procedures can be used (see, for example,
OECD 1994, 73).
A broader-based survey of employers, the World Competitiveness Report (WRC), has
recently been used to provide another measure of the stringency of cross-country employment
regulations.5 Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999) exploit one question in the WCR survey to
obtain an indicator of labor market flexibility. The survey question asks respondents to rate the
“flexibility of enterprises to adjust job security and compensation standards to economic
realities” on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 indicates “none at all” and 100 “a great deal.” Column
7 of Table 1 provides values of this flexibility index, averaged over 1984-90 (Di Tella and
MacCulloch 1999, Table A).
Yet other researchers have offered more impressionistic indexes of the severity of the
regulatory regime. One such index, used by Bertola (1990) and based on an (unstated) mix of
employer perceptions and legal rules, is given for completeness in column (2) of Table 1.
Finally, severance pay entitlements as of 1984 for our own sample of 21 countries are
given in the first column of Table 1. If these are then ranked in ascending order of generosity,
we can compare the relation between our "index" (i.e. the Lazear measure) and that of the other
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studies - at least for the 11 countries common to each, using OECD (1994, p.74) interpolations
for the odd missing values. The rankings evidently display some diversity, our measure of the
stringency of employment protection correlating most closely with that of Bertola (1990).
This diversity is inevitable. As Grubb and Wells (1993, p.33) caution, "there is no
simple and objective way of defining" an overall index of the severity of the regulatory climate.
Their own index fails to consider non-legal constraints (e.g. union restrictions) or, indeed,
issues of legal interpretation. Moreover, there is the inevitable problem of additional
subjectivity introduced by any weighting scheme - implicit in their case. In the circumstances,
might not rankings derived from employer surveys better capture "the many dimensions that
such institutional arrangements associated with employment protection laws encompass" (Di
Tella and MacCulloch 1999, p.8)? The fact that some employer surveys are available in a time
series form might appear an added bonus in this regard. Unfortunately, apart from the issue of
their representativeness (the firm heterogeneity point), there is the problem of precision of
response. Employers may have difficulty in interpreting questions as to the flexibility or
otherwise of the regulatory climate. As a case in point, Addison and Siebert (1999, p.56) have
noted that there is little correspondence in ranking as between two subsequent ad hoc employer
conducted by the Commission in 1989 and 1994. Major changes in ranking do not seem to
correspond to observed changes in national employment protection laws or their application. In
addition, employer responses are likely to be mediated by the cycle and it is not clear that this
relationship has been convincingly sterilized in extant treatments (e.g. Morgan 1998).
Consistency problems may thus severely reduce the usefulness of employer surveys as a partial
solution to the moment-in-time limitation of more comprehensive OECD-type indexes of
employment protection.
This brings us to post-Lazear studies that not only use a more comprehensive measure
of employment protection than severance pay but also a richer array of controls. The
best-known treatments are by Nickell (1997) and Scarpetta (1996), who use moment-in-time
estimates of employment protection taken from the OECD (1994) Jobs Study. The studies
cover almost identical time periods - 1983-94 and 1983-9 , respectively - and each employs a
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comprehensive set of rather similar independent variables. The latter include unemployment
benefits, expenditures on active labor market policies, measures of the tax wedge, union
density, and the degree of coordination of collective bargaining. The sample of countries is 20
for Nickell and 17 for Scarpetta.
Nickell's dependent variables are short- and long-term unemployment and the
employment-population ratio. Estimation is via GLS random effects using averaged data for
two subperiods, 1983-88 and 1989-94. He reports that employment protection effects are
largely statistically insignificant. Scarpetta focuses on unemployment: overall unemployment,
youth unemployment, long-term unemployment, and non-employment. Unlike Nickell, he uses
time-series variation in his key variables, other than the employment protection argument. That
said, much of this variation is obtained by extending single data point observations. He
concludes to the contrary that employment protection causes unemployment, particularly
among youths. A harsh reading of both studies would be that the use of a more extensive set of
controls is achieved at the cost of no small imprecision of the explanatory variables. Although
the lack of variation in the employment protection variable may be less of a problem given the
short time frame of the studies, the different conclusions reached as to its impact are disturbing.
Disquiet over this conflicting evidence has generated a wave of new studies. Of these
perhaps the most interesting is by Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999), who combine a
Lazear-type treatment with a new time series on employment protection derived from the
WCR, discussed earlier. The dependent variables follow Lazear, the main difference being the
inclusion of a variable proxying the generosity of national unemployment benefits, using the
OECD (1994) summary measure of the unemployment insurance system. Using data on 20
countries, 1984-90, Di Tella and MacCulloch report robust, positive associations between
flexibility and employment and the labor force participation rate. Less clear-cut, however, is the
role of labor market flexibility in reducing unemployment.6
Supportive evidence as to the costs of employment protection has also been reported by
Garibaldi and Mauro (1999). Following the Nickell procedure of averaging several years of
data - over the interval 1980-1998 - the authors examine the association between the growth in
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total civilian employment and employment protection legislation (using the OECD index) for a
21-country sample. Their controls include the unemployment insurance net replacement ratio,
union density, the extent of bargaining coordination, overall taxes, payroll taxes, population
growth, and the average change in inflation (to proxy the business cycle and the macro policy
regime). They report strongly negative associations between the degree of employment
protection and employment growth in cross section. That said, the coefficient estimates of the
employment protection variable are imprecisely estimated in panel regressions, which result
they attribute to the time-invariant nature of the variable.
Further support for the Lazear argument is provided by Elmeskov, Martin, and
Scarpetta (1998), in what is largely an extension of Scarpetta's (1996) analysis. Apart from
including more countries and covering a modestly longer time interval, the principal innovation
of this follow-up study resides in its use of a second data point for the OECD employment
protection index (see below). The dependent variable is structural unemployment, as measured
by the predicted nonaccelerating wage inflation rate of unemployment. Broadly speaking, the
results reported by the authors suggest that structural unemployment is elevated in more
generous employment protection regimes. That said, they also argue that the effects of
employment protection, inter al., are mediated by the collective bargaining environment.
Specifically, its adverse consequences are reduced in countries characterized by either
centralized and coordinated or decentralized collective bargaining than in nations where
sectoral wage bargaining predominates with limited coordination.7
Finally, a new study by the OECD (1999), which provides updated and revised
information on its comprehensive index of job protection, has created considerable controversy
precisely because of its finding of insignificant associations between that index and either
unemployment or employment (Financial Times 1999). These results are obtained using
two-period panel regressions in the manner of Nickell (1997) that employ the now familiar
battery of controls. And they hold for disaggregations of the employment protection measure
and for the main demographic components of the two outcome measures.
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Against this backdrop, the Laz ar approach has advantages and disadvantages. The
advantage is the use of a long time series on dismissals protection that is consistent across time
and requires relatively few judgment calls on the part of the investigator. The disadvantages are
twofold. First, that indicator can offer only a partial view of the regulatory apparatus. Second,
there is the separate issue of an omitted variables problem. Given our 1956-84 sample period,
we were unable to construct a long enough time series on variables such as union density and
aspects of unemployment insurance system emphasized in more recent studies. To this extent,
our point estimates of the effect of dismissals protection could well be biased, although we
have indicated that we are not reassured by extant treatments that have deployed a richer mix of
covariates. In evaluating the Lazear model, however, the prime initial consideration must be
one of replication, using appropriate econometric techniques. Nevertheless, despite the
problems of assembling the relevant time series, future work using more contemporary data
must seek to include a wider array of independent variables than considered here. Yet we have
also indicated that the construction of a time series on employment protection, the essential
contribution of Lazear, remains central. Absent this, discussion over the disemployment effects
of employment protection will continue to be mired in controversy.
3. Econometric Issues
The use of a panel of data to study the effects of employment protection on labor
market performance seems to be a useful approach because it combines cross-country and
within-country variation. Although a simple cross-se ti n data set is able to provide enough
variation in both the dependent and independent variables of the model, it necessarily fails to
capture the dynamic effects of severance pay entitlements on labor market outcomes. For its
part, a single-country time series would probably not producestatistically significant
coefficient estimates for the key dismissals protection argument because changes in
employment protection are fairly sporadic even over more than two decades.
However, if panel estimation has the strength (and richness) of combiing cross- ection
and time-series information, it can also reflect the problems specific to each. Nations have their
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own characteristics - in particular, labor market institutions differ widely across countries - so
that no single model can be expected to explain the behavior of a given set of outcome
variables. In this case, the pooled OLS regression (ultimately favored by Lazear) should be
avoided because it will produce biased estimates. In these circumstances, it is conventional to
deploy a model with fixed or random effects. Both approaches assume a common slope and
different intercepts; intercepts that in the random effects specification shift around an estimated
mean in accordance with an individual error component specific to each cross-section unitand
an error component associated with time, rather than being assumed to be fixed for each unit.
A second problem stems from the time series nature of the data. We refer to the likely
presence of serially correlated errors. If present, the latter have implications for the efficiency
of the estimation and may lead to erroneous statistical inference. In these circumstances,
transformation of the data is necessary so as to satisfy the standard assumptions of zero
covariance between residuals through time.
To anticipate our findings, we do indeed detect the presence of highly correlated
residuals in each of the cross-section units in both the fixed effects and random effects models
run on the untransformed data. The individual autocorrelation coefficients are highly significant
and large in absolute magnitude; a result that may of course flag poor specification. Abstracting
from the latter issue, we address the autocorrelation problem by: (a) running a fixed effects
model on the pooled data; (b) computing the autocorrelation coefficient, $r ; and (c) re-
estimating the model (fixed or random effects) on the transformed data, where the transformed
variables are given by y y y x x xit it it it it it
* *$ , $= - = -- -r r1 1. This is the asymptotic efficient
estimator noted by Hsiao (1986, p.56), who recommends finding a consistent estimate of $r
from a first-stage fixed effects model and then applying the covariance method to the
transformed data. A standard LM test was duly performed on the estimated residuals to check
whether autocorrelation was removed.
In addition, we employ a feasible GLS procedure that in a first stage - to control for
serial correlation - transforms the data using the estimated $r  ob ained from OLS (or fixed
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effects) on the untransformed data, and then applies the GLS estimator, assuming that the
residuals are both cross sectionally correlated and heteroskedastic (Kmenta 1997, Ch. 12). This
estimation applies a SUR technique (Parks estimator) and is implemented using the software
EViews.
Two remaining issues are tackled prior to a final substantive exercise that evaluates the
properties of the Lazear model in the specific context of dynamic panel estimation (Arellano
and Bond 1991). First, we informally address the potential contribution of influential
observations to our central and essentially negative results. Second, given the sporadic nature
of changes in the key severance pay argument, which may not therefore have immediate effects
on labor markets, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the use of a smoothed
severance pay variable obtained though a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
4. Findings
Table 2 contains results of fitting the Lazear model to the pooled cross-section
time-series data without contry-specific effects. The regressions are the exact counterpart of
those in Lazear (1990, Table VII). As in Lazear, the severance pay argument is statistically
significant in the first three regressions. The odd man out is the hours worked equation, where
the coefficient estimate of SEV is positive and insignificant at conventional levels. We believe
the latter result has more to do with the inaccuracy of Lazear's hours data than anything else.
[Table 2 near here]
The positive association between severance pay and unemployment and the negative
relationship between severance pay and employment and labor force participation seem to
illustrate the adverse labor market consequences of more generous severance pay regimes. Also
consonant with Lazear, the GROWTH.SEV (and GROWTH) covariate is statistically
insignificant and the population control, WRKAGE, is strongly significant. It seems therefore
that, although our data differ in many respects from those of Lazear, there is broad
confirmation of his preferred specification.
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When country dummies are included in the regressions, and again abstracting from the
hours result, there is again reasonable correspondence with Lazear. The findings in Table 3 are
for a fuller specification than in Lazear, who provides fixed-effects results for specifications
containing only severance pay and the year variables (see his Table V). The most important
(common) result is the positive and statistically significant coefficient of SEV in the
unemployment equation. (As in Lazear, SEV is negative and insignificant in the employment
equation and positive and insignificant in the labor force participation equation.)
[Table 3 near here]
As we have argued, however, the real issue is whether or not these results can be used
to make predictions about the role of severance pay in generating, say, unemployment (see
Lazear's Table VIII). The pooled OLS results evidently produce biased estimates, while the
fixed effects specification, although controlling for country heterogeneity, may yield
misleading statistical inference if there is serial correlation in the error structure. From the LM
test statistics in Table 3, it can be seen that the null of no autocorrelation can be rejected. We
note parenthetically that implementation of a nonlinear procedure that simultaneously estimates
the parameters of the model and the autocorrelation coefficient confirmed that the latter
coefficient was indeed highly significant.
There can be no question that Lazear (1990, 716-717) is aware of the problem, but in
our view he does not adequately tackle the data problems. Rather, he elects to tackle one
problem at a time; that is, he compares (a) the pooled OLS with the fixed effects results, and
then (b) the OLS and the random effects model (REM) specifications, before (c) finally
addressing the autocorrelation issue.
The point is that in (b) the error component associated with time is not present in his
error components specification, only the cross-country effect; while in (c) country fixed effects
are ignored. In any event, we note that the REM specification assumes that the autocorrel ion
of the residuals remains constant irrespective of the time distance between them, while the
commonly assumed first-order autocorrelation implies that autocorrelation declines over time.
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And, according to our tests, application of random effects to the untransformed data did not
remove autocorrelation.
[Table 4 near here]
Given the clear utoregressive pattern of the residuals, the data have to be differenced
according to the estimated au ocorrelation coefficients. After this transformation, we obtain the
fixed effects results given in Table 4. (Results for the alternative random effects specification
are similar, and are provided in Appendix Table 1.) The consequences of controlling for the
autocorrelation present in the time series are quite dramatic: the effects of SEV are now
statistically insignificant throughout. At this stage, then, there is no statistical corroboration of
the claim that tougher dismissals protection leads to more unfavorable labor market outcomes.
It is worth pointing out that once we difference the data and re-run the model, the
problems of autocorrelation do appear to be solved if we use a REM rather than a fixed- ffects
specification. The results are provided in Appendix Table 1, where it can be seen that the LM
tests on the residuals strongly reject the presence of first order auto egressive errors, with the
possible exception of the employment equation. This is because the random effects model
additionally corrects for the remaining post-transformation nonzero covariance between
residuals over time.
Inspection of the variance of the residuals on each pooled unit in Table 4 (and
Appendix Table 1) fails to indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity. As an additional check
on the homoskedaticity of the residuals, we applied a weighted least squares regression
procedure in which the data was transformed according to the residual variance for each
country (see Kmenta 1997, Ch. 12). The results, which are available from the authors on
request, do suggest that, after controlling for autocorrelation and introducing country-specific
effects, it is indeed correct to assume an ho oskedastic error structure.
Another concern is the possible presence of cross-sectional correlation. Here the issue
is whether or not the economic interdependence between the countries in the sample influences
our results. After controlling for autoregressive errors and cross-section heterogeneity, we
applied the SUR weighted least squares option available in EViews. (The results are given in
The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment J. Addison, P. Teixeira e J.-L. Grosso
G.E.M.F. – F.E.U.C. 15
Appendix Table 2.) Compared with the REM estimation, for example, the parameters generally
maintained their signs and magnitudes, and we observe a slight increase in the statistical
significance of the GROWTH and GROWTH.SEV point estimates. Again, this conformity is to
be expected because the REM model assumes a nonzero correlation coefficient between the
residuals of different cross-section units at a given point in time.
It is also worth observing that our results do not appear to be driven by outliers. The
unemployment regression is the most susceptible in this regard, since cross-country differences
in unemployment are quite large and because unemployment development varies across
countries. Visual inspection of our data indicates that Spain and Israel are the most likely
outlier candidates. Unemployment in Spain increased from 5.2 percent in 1979 (the first
observation for this country) to 20.3 percent in 1984. For its part, Israel shows some sharp
movements in unemployment in 1967 and again in 1975. Deleting the two countries from the
sample produced virtually no change in the statistical significance of the covariates reported
earlier. This is a rather informal statement of the issue. We did not attempt a formal sensitivity
analysis for reasons of tractability. First, it is a nontrivial exercise to interpret potential
outsiders in a very long panel of data of this type. Second, and more important, the
conventional methods used to detect leverage points and influential data are derived assuming a
standard linear model (e.g. B lsley, Khu, and Welsch 1980). There is no guarantee that the
usual diagnostic checking procedures can easily be applied under the very different estimation
methods used here.
[Table 5 near here]
Because regulations on employment protection change only from time to time, a
further issue is whether it is appropriate to impose an immediate reaction of employment and
unemployment to changes in severance pay. To investigate this issue, we applied a
Hodrick-Prescott filter to the severance pay data. As can be seen from Table 5, smoothing the
employment protection variable produced only a slight increase in the precision of the point
estimates of SEV, none of which achieved statistically significance at conventional levels.
The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment J. Addison, P. Teixeira e J.-L. Grosso
G.E.M.F. – F.E.U.C. 16
The strong residual autocorrelation detected in the un ransformed data points to
persistence in the outcome indicators. As a final exercise, therefore, it seems sensible to look in
detail at the dynamic properties of the model. Our approach uses the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991); a methodology that
extends the first difference instrumental variables method suggested by Anderson and Hsiao
(1981) to dynamic fixed effects models. (Fixed effects estimation of an autoregressive model
produces biased estimates.) This technique yields asymptotic standard errors that are robust to
general cross- ection and time-series heteroskedasticity under the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation in the errors. To test this hypothesis, Arellano and Bond developed a first- and
second-order serial correlation test statistic based on the GMM residuals.
[Table 6 near here]
Results of fitting this dynamic version of the Lazear model are given in Table 6. (The
estimation was implemented using the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) software made available by
Dr. Jurgen Doornik of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics.)8 The most
important result is the failure to observe statistically significant effects of SEV on the key
outcome indicators EMPPOP and UNRATE. That said, there is some indication that severance
pay has an impact on the remaining outcome indicators, even if the LFPR effect is perverse
from a conventional (and Lazear) perspective. In all cases, the coefficient estimates of the
autoregressive terms are highly significant. The use of OLS methods can be seen to produce
upwardly biased coefficient estimates and understated standard errors. The GROWTH variable
also seems to become more important in explaining labor market outcomes than was previously
the case, while the WRKAGE covariate evidently loses some of its explanatory power. All the
regression statistics perform as expected. Thus, the Wald statistic is very high and the
hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first difference residuals, given
by the m2 statistic, cannot be rejected. In sum, our dynamic representation of the Lazear m del
casts further doubt on the argument that severance pay has adverse consequences for
employment and unemployment development.
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5. Concluding Remarks
This paper has reestimated Lazear's influential empirical model of the effects of
dismissals protection on employment and unemployment, using corrected data for all variables
and taking account of econometric problems associated with cross-country heterogeneity and
serial correlation in the time series for each country. The upshot was that the adverse labor
market consequences of more generous severance pay detected by Lazear w re not confirmed
in either static or dynamic representations of his model.
These results do not of course imply that the effects of dismissals laws, or employment
protection legislation more generally, are benign. They pertain solely to the effects of severance
pay in the framework of Lazear's parsimonious estimating equation. The use of severance pay
to characterize the entire regulatory apparatus of dismissals protection is clearly an
oversimplification and possibly a poor proxy for the stringency of that dismissals protection.
Clearly, any two countries with the same recorded severance pay entitlements will inevitably
differ in other aspects of dismissals protection. Similarly, the sparse formal representation of
employment/unemployment determination in the model raises a potentially severe omitted
variables problem.
To be sure, recent studies that include a more encompassing measure of dismissals
protection and a wider array of control variables have yielded some support for Lazear's
empirical conjectures, if not his methodology. More stringent employment protection has thus
been linked to elevated unemployment, lower employment/labor force participation, and
reduced employment growth. Absence of a suitable time series on variables used in such
post-Lazear studies, however, precluded our testing the adequacy of the severance pay
argument or the importance of the omitted variables problem. We have also noted the problems
attaching to alternative employment protection measures and the dubious pedigree of some
explanatory variables popular in the new literature. Moreover, the evidence on adverse labor
market consequences of employment protection is not overwhelming. For example, studies
using updated measures of the OECD index that provide two data points for this comprehensive
measure of employment protection either fail to detect adverse effects on the employment and
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unemployment aggregates in two-period panel regressions (and first differences), or seem to
downplay negative effects, where these are observed, by emphasizing interactions between
employment protection and the collective bargaining and tax regimes.
Just as with our own findings, we would not conclude from the latter studies that
employment protection is benign after all. A more balanced view would be that the research
focus has been too oblique. That is to say, the impact of employment protection on
unemployment and employment aggregates is somewhat indirect and difficult to isolate from
other causal factors. One alternative research strategy would be to focus on the point at which
dismissals protection can be expected more directly to affect behavior. An obvious example is
the speed of employment adjustment to demand shocks. Here the immediate goal would be to
discover whether observed differences in the employment adjustment process are linked in a
systematic way to extant representations of the stringency of national employment protection
rules (see Addison and Teixeira 1999). Another example would be to analyze job flow data (see
Blanchard and Portugal 1998; Garibaldi 1998). In both cases, the ultimate goal would be to
trace the implications of changes in employment adjustment and flows to average levels and
durations of employment and unemployment.9
Despite the conflicting results reported here, it is assuredly of importance to get a better
grip on the effects of employment protection. This is perhaps nowhere more important than in
Europe at a time when the European Union is seeking to implement a wide range of job
protection and analogous mandates at European level (Addison and Siebert 1999). It would be
particularly unfortunate were the results of our own cross-c u try inquiry and the mixed
evidence of the wider literature to encourage the perception that supranational legislation is
benign.
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Footnotes
1. That said, there is no substitute for carefully parameterized models of individual employment
protection mandates. For one such attempt, see Addison and Chilton (1997).
2. On the important contribution of growth in the working age population to employment
development, see Krueger and Pischke (1997).
3. The OECD (1999, Table 2.4) has recently incorporated information on collective dismissal
regulations in a revised measure of the overall strictness of employment protection legislation
(OECD 1999, Table 2.5).
4. A useful survey of these studies is provided by the OECD (1999, Table 2.C.1).
5. The survey covers 21 countries. The number of returned questionnaires varies by year,
averaging 1,531 between 1984 and 1990. There was no survey in 1987. The flexibility question
was changed in 1990, and subsequently dropped.
6. At issue is whether the short time series of this study is really sufficient to capture actual
changes in the regulatory environment, which occur but sporadically. The limited time span
may also mean that it is difficult to identify patterns of adjustment implicit in the model's use of
lagged variables.
7. A worrying feature of the study is its heavy reliance on collective bargaining systems.
Classifying countries by the coordination or otherwise of collective bargaining and the degree
of centralization and cooperation is a nontrivial task. It shares certain commonalities with the
construction of an employment protection index in this regard.
8. This procedure assumes a homogeneous lagged response, an assumption that is probably
violated in the population. Given that the time series is relatively short for analyzing an
autoregressive error structure, however, this assumption is unlikely to cause major problems
and was necessary to gather sufficient information for parameter estimation.
9. Another option of course would be to temporarily abandon cross-country analyses in favor of
national studies, in which framework individual mandates can more easily be parameterized
and any tradeoffs rendered more transparent.
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Data Appendix
This paper uses data from Lazear (1990) that have been corrected for errors of
omission and commission. Full details are supplied by Addison and Gros  (1996). The sample
period is identical to Lazear, while the (initial) sample of countries has been expanded by one
nation, namely, Finland. Lazear collected data on Finland but treated them as "non-applicable,"
presumably because there is no requirement in Finnish law for employers to pay severance pay
(over and above pay for notice periods). But it became possible for employees to be dismissed
for economic reasons in 1979, and so Finland enters our data set from that date and severance
pay is duly coded as 0 month.
Unlike Addison and Grosso (1996), we follow Lazear in including Portugal within the
sample. Indeed, the Portuguese data cover the entire sample period, 1956-84, rather than
1970-84 as in Lazear. The reasons for this extension have to do with the legal definition of
collective dismissals in Portugal. The employment threshold is so low that we treat the law on
collective dismissals as applicable to individual dismissals. (For an elaboration of this
argument, as well as the problems with Lazear's own measure of Portuguese severance pay, see
Addison and Teixeira, 1997).
The countries listed in Table 1 plus Israel make up our 21-nati n sample. Israel is not
included in the table because of the nature of the comparisons being effected there. By contrast,
Lazear's final sample is just 18 countries.
Most of the differences between ourselves and Lazear pertain to the severance pay
variable, although many of the same sources are used in its construction (see Addison and
Grosso, 1996, fn.5). The more important differences in this regard include the following. First,
there are no statutory severance pay entitlements in Denmark, as claimed by Lazear; such
obligations are instead fixed under collective bargaining. Denmark is thus coded here as 0
month throughout and not as 0 for 1956-70 and 1 for 1971-84. Second, for four countries -
France, Italy, Norway, and Spain - severance pay fails to reach the levels indicated by Lazear.
Third, Germany has no statutory severance pay - although service-related compensation for
socially unwarranted dismissals is set down under 1969 legislation - and is here coded 0
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throughout rather than as 1 in Lazear. Fourth, legislation covering severance pay has long
applied in the U.K., but is unaccountably neglected by Lazear; and thus further reduces his
sample size. Relatedly, Lazear adopts the convention of discarding all data for a particular
country/year if data for any one of the four dependent variables are missing. This procedure
serves to further truncate the overall sample size, largely because of missing data on hours. As
a practical matter, however, constraining the number of observations to be equal across all four
outcome measure regressions did not materially affect any of the results reported here.
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Table 1. Severance Pay and Alternative Indicators of the Stringency of Employment Protection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Severance IOE EC WCR
Pay employer Employer flexibility
Entitlement Bertola Grubb-Wells OECD survey index,survey index, index,
Country (months)a ranking ranking index 1985 1985 1984-90
Belgium 0 9 5 10.5 2.5 113 41.83
Denmark 0 2 2 3.25 1 61.76
France 1 8 6 9.5 2.5 134 42.33
Germany 0 6 7 12 2.5 83 41.49
Greece 1 10 11 130 30.28
Ireland 1.5 3 2.75 1.5 111 47.57
Italy 8.8 10 8 14.25 3 151 39.87
The Netherlands 0 3 4 7.25 2.5 73 46.7
Portugal 10 11 12.5 2 33.12
Spain 6.6 9 11.25 3 29.81
United Kingdom 2.5 4 1 2.25 0.5 39 58.08
Austria 4 9 1.5 41.29
Finland 0 10.5 1 50.11
Norway 0 9.75 1.5 40.89
Sweden 0 7 8.5 2 40.77
Switzerland 0 1.75 61.69
United States 0 1 0.36 72.66
Japan 0 5 3.71 55.43
Australia 0 3.26 38.45
New Zealand 5.5 0.72 40.95
Spearman rank correlation
Coefficientb 0.654c 0.361 0.389 0.097 -- 0.434
aThe entries in column (1) are taken from the present study and pertain to 1984. All other
index/ranking values are for the late 1980s, unless otherwise indicated. The construction of the various
indexes/rankings is discussed in the text.
bThe rank correlation exercise is for the first 11 countries in the table, where missing values are
based on OECD (1994, Table 6.7, Panel B) interpolations.
cStatistically significant at the .05 level.
Sources: Bertola (1990); Commission (1986); Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999); Grubb and Wells
(1993); IOE (1985); OECD (1994).
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Table 2. Pooled Estimations - No Country Dummies
Dependent Variable
Independent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LFPR HOURS
Intercept -0.254 0.103 -0.228 48.336
(0.048) (0.028) (0.045) (3.659)
SEV -0.0045 0.0021 -0.0038 0.095
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.064)
GROWTH -0.066 0.029 -0.054 11.274
(0.073) (0.042) (0.068) (5.535)
GROWTH.SEV -0.002 0.004 0.0004 -0.753
(0.017) (0.01) (0.0162) (1.294)
WRKAGE 1.044 -0.097 1.032 -5.333
(0.074) (0.043) (0.069) (5.633)
R2 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.29
$s 0.041 0.024 0.038 3.06
n 536 536 536 513
Regressions include YEAR and YEAR2. $s  is the standard error of the estimated
regression.
Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses.
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Table 3. Fixed Effects Regressions
Dependent variable
Independent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LFPR HOURS
SEV 0.00076 0.0013 0.0012 0.053
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.045)
GROWTH 0.024 0.016 0.033 12.231
(0.033) (0.029) (0.032) (3.029)
GROWTH.SEV -0.0087 0.0084 -0.0049 -0.461
(0.0074) (0.0063) (0.0074) (0.67)
WRKAGE 0.548 0.35 0.71 2.65
(0.062) (0.056) (0.061) (5.681)
R2 0.9 0.77 0.89 0.83
$s 0.017 0.015 0.017 1.51
LM 22.92 17.14 7.34 17.13
n 536 536 536 513
Regressions include YEAR and YEAR2. $s  is the estimated standard error of the
regression.
Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. LM is the first
order autocorrelation test statistic. The estimated autocorrelation coefficients $r  resulting from
applying a Marquardt nonlinear least squares algorithm that simultaneously estimates the
coefficients b  and r  are 0.94 (0.02), 0.83 (0.03), 0.94 (0.05), and 0.84 (0.02), respectively.
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Regressions with Correction for Aut correlation
Dependent variable
Independent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LFPR HOURS
SEV -0.00047 0.0052 0.00028 0.0076
(0.00034) (0.00050) (0.00031) (0.0434)
GROWTH 0.022 0.0218 0.0071 3.988
(0.0091) (0.0150) (0.0087) (1.310)
GROWTH.SEV 0.0032 0.0037 0.0049 0.113
(0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.276)
WRKAGE 0.337 0.398 0.477 -15.095
(0.106) (0.132) (0.095) (12.260)
R2 0.35 0.41 0.39 0.34
$s 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.780
LM 39.76 18.37 6.22 18.77
n 536 536 536 513
Regressions include YEAR and YEAR2. $s  is the estimated standard error of the
regression.
Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. LM is the first
order autocorrelation test statistic.
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Regressions with Correction for Aut correlation (Hodrick-Prescott
smoothed series)
Dependent variable
Independent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LFPR HOURS
SEV 0.0017 0.00097 0.0015 0.119
(0.0010) (0.00113) (0.0014) (0.073)
GROWTH 0.010 -0.029 -0.004 3.471
(0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.765)
GROWTH.SEV 0.0004 0.007 0.0038 -0.142
 (0.0042) (0.012) (0.0048) (0.312)
WRKAGE 0.309 0.413 0.462 -1.089
(0.067) (0.155) (0.095) (9.514)
R2 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.37
$s 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.788
LM 18.53 24.51 18.13 13.92
n 536 536 536 513
Regressions include YEAR and YEAR2. $s  is the estimated standard error of the
regression.
Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. LM is the first
order autocorrelation test statistic.
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Table 6. Dynamic Specification of the Lazear Model: GMM estimatesa
Dependent variable Y it
Independent EMPPOP UNRATE LFPR HOURS
variable
OLSb GMMc OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Y i(t-1) 0.93 0.763 0.942 0.722 0.929 0.799 0.886 0.498
(0.024) (0.134) (0.065) (0.147) (0.032) (0.113) (0.02) (0.224)
SEV 0.00007 -0.001 0.000280.000064 0.00021 -0.001 -0.024 0.058
(0.00012)(0.0008)(0.00024)(0.0009)(0.00017)(0.0005) (0.016) (0.025)
GROWTH 0.07 0.054 -0.134 -0.094 0.0119 0.01 7.264 5.901
(0.021) (0.029) (0.031) (0.03) (0.0919) (0.019) (1.713) (2.602)
GROWTH.SEV -0.00099 0.0059 0.0081 0.0033 0.0031 0.0092 0.558 0.251
(0.00272)(0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.449) (0.474)
WRKAGE 0.052 0.12 0.085 0.488 0.095 0.282 -1.912 10.895
(0.034) (0.081) (0.058) (0.318) (0.04) (0.097) (3.12) (11.858)
M2d -2.11 -1.6 0.22 1.02
Waldd 100.8 [5] 299.0 [5] 348.3 [5] 16.6 [5]
R2 0.88 0.85 0.91 0.88
n 536 536 535 514 536 515 505 484
aThe equations were estimated using the DPD software, developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991). The version used in this study was made available by Dr. JurgenDoornik of the
Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics. Standard errors of the coefficient
estimates are given in parentheses.
bOLS is the within-group (i.e. fixed effects) estimation in levels of the variables.
cThe GMM method estimates the model in first differences. The variables SEV,
GROWTH, GROWTH.SEV and WRKAGE are assumed exogenous and used as instruments.
dThe m2 is a test for lack of second order serial correlation in the first difference
residuals; the Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables
(degrees of freedom for c2 are in brackets). The m2 and Wald tests are both asymptotically
robust to general heteroskedascity.
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Appendix Table 1. Random Effects Regressions with Correction for Autoc rrelation
Dependent variable
Independent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LFPR HOURS
SEV -0.00054 0.00069 -0.00035 -0.0070
(0.00034) (0.00049) (0.00030) (0.0424)
GROWTH 0.0022 -0.0207 0.0070 4.016
(0.0098) (0.0148) (0.0087) (1.303)
GROWTH.SEV 0.0031 0.0039 0.0049 0.108
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.274)
WRKAGE 0.364 0.283 0.501 -13.620
(0.103) (0.121) (0.092) (11.261)
R2 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.31
$s 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.775
LM 9.05 0.82 1.07 1.86
n 536 536 536 513
Regressions include YEAR and YEAR2. $s  is the estimated standard error of the
regression.
Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. LM is the first
order autocorrelation test statistic.
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Appendix Table 2. Feasible GLS Estimation for Cross-Secti nally Correlated Residuals
Dependent variable
Independent variable
EMPPOP UNRATE LFPR HOURS
SEV -0.00020 0.00065 -0.00017 0.00006
(0.00016) (0.00046) (0.00014) (0.01631)
GROWTH 0.0018 -0.0073 -0.0066 4.417
(0.0042) (0.0071) (0.0030) (0.531)
GROWTH.SEV 0.0033 0.0035 0.0048 -0.216
(0.0012) (0.0071) (0.0015) (0.178)
WRKAGE 0.304 0.336 0.483 -12.417
(0.042) (0.054) (0.026) (5.693)
R2 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.34
$s 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.781
LM 2.00 1.86 2.21 1.96
n 515 465 515 489
Regressions include YEAR and YEAR2. $s  is the estimated standard error of the
regression.
Standard errors of the coefficient estimates are given in parentheses. LM is the first
order autocorrelation test statistic.
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